In addition, fears of negative integration expressed by civil society or Member States cannot be dismissed. One such fear is that regulation will not be in line with society`s values, exposing the EU to a race to the bottom through regulatory competition and/or the erosion of regulation through regulatory cooperation beyond democratic reach. Another is that investor-state arbitration will limit the political scope of future – probably stricter – consumer and environmental protection. Much depends on the agreements in question and the similarity of preferences between trading partners. The challenge for the EU is to explicitly consider not only the impact of trade, but also the impact on the EU`s economic order. The ongoing trade dynamics in the EU are pushing them even further on the path of deepening globalisation through comprehensive trade agreements. The abandonment of multilateralism in trade has drawbacks for both the world and the EU. The case for comprehensive trade agreements depends on the elimination of non-tariff barriers, but the benefits are not simple and the impact on society is complex. EU trade policy values appreciate European values, but the extent to which the European model is maintained is unclear, given the main focus on trade during negotiations and the complexity of the implications to be taken into account by negotiators. CETA`s experience has been exemplary in this regard. They also raise the question of why the European Commission, on behalf of the EU, should grant a third country like Canada what it does not grant, for example Norway, which, as a member of the European Economic Area, is more deeply integrated into the EU but has no say in the standards and rules of the EU`s internal market. The EU`s bilateral trade agreements are then a second best option, but their implications are complex.
As Rodrik points out, economists have not contributed to a complete picture of trade by tending to focus on the benefits of trade and not discussing more complex consequences such as the distribution of benefits and the effects of regulation.23 With respect to the EU`s free trade agreement with Canada, the CETA Agreement establishes far-reaching rules for bilateral trade. The EU should have had a stronger starting position than Canada, and so it is somewhat puzzling that the EU seems to have made little use of it. In fact, he seemed more interested in simply demonstrating his ability to strike a trade deal than in engaging in public discussions about the broader impact of the trade deal on European society and the European model that emerges from the fine print of the deal. However, after being signed and ratified at EU level, CETA can now enter into force later in 2017, but only provisionally. Under pressure from Member States, CETA has been classified as a mixed agreement, which amounts to recognising the fact that comprehensive agreements can encroach on Member States` competences in the field. It follows that all EU Member States and some regions have a right of veto, as CETA still needs to be ratified by a total of 37 national and regional parliaments, which is expected to be a long and uncertain process. This right of veto could be an important counterweight to any attempt to centralise Member States` competences at EU level, in breach of the principle of subsidiarity. It ensures a role for the European model in the EU`s trade negotiations.
The European model of reconciling competitiveness and economic growth with social and environmental protection is at the heart of the EU`s identity. Global trade agreements have an impact on the form and sustainability of the European model at a time when this model is not yet fully consolidated. The success of the European model is of paramount importance in the current situation, where the EU is looking for a vision to revive the project of European integration and where achieving results will be crucial to revive citizens` support for populist and nationalist tendencies to disintegration. Given the current debate on whether economic benefits are sufficiently distributed to all citizens, convey the idea that trade takes precedence over other European values (e.g. B, social and environmental concerns) would jeopardise the sustainability of the EU project as such. More generally, the same would be true if trust in national and international institutions and democracy were weakened, fuelling the rise of populism and trade protectionism in many parts of the world. With tariff barriers between WTO members already relatively low, the European Commission has launched a new generation of international agreements that also aim to abolish non-tariff barriers. In the absence of a single trade agreement, in most cases the EU negotiates comprehensive (i.e. deep) free trade agreements with third countries.
The case for these comprehensive trade agreements depends on the largely untapped benefits of eliminating non-tariff barriers. These benefits are more difficult to quantify because they are conditioned by the scope of the agreements in question and also have a deeper impact on society. The asset allocation system put in place by the PCA did not fully come into effect until 2008 – and even then, its implementation continued to be hampered by political tensions and weak administrative capacity. In particular, delays in implementation were related to the lack of trust between the NCP and the SPLM/APLS. The lack of transparency in Sudan`s oil sector has also undermined progress in implementation, as evidenced by the lack of publicly available information on contracts between the Sudanese government and its investors. And the lack of information on the country`s total oil production and the amount of revenues makes it almost impossible to independently verify the level of oil exploitation, production and revenues. Currently, oil accounts for 98% of the Revenue of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and the majority of oil fields are located in the south. Although the Federal Government receives oil revenues (from one year after the signing of the PCA) in accordance with the terms of the asset-sharing agreement, its lack of capacity to plan, allocate and spend these resources would have facilitated an increase in corruption within the SPLM/SPLA. .
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